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ABSTRACT 
 
The survival encoding effect, or “adaptive memory”, shows a memory advantage to information 
processed in the context of one’s own survival.  The self-reference effect, which also confers a 
memory advantage but to information processed in reference to the self, does not grant an 
advantage to memory recall as great as the survival encoding effect.  The present study examines 
how each of these effects operates across stimuli type, and whether the survival encoding effect 
operates functionally as a distinct encoding process or as an augmented form of self-reference.  
Survival encoding and self-referential paradigms were adapted to examine the same concrete 
noun words in Study 1 (n = 60) and the same abstract trait words in Study 2 (n = 61), parsing out 
words related to self and other for each encoding process.  A within-subjects design was used 
across five encoding conditions: survival-self, survival-other, self-reference, other-reference, and 
pleasantness (acting as a deep encoding comparison).  In Study 1, significant main effects were 
found for person (self vs. other) and strategy (survival-relevance vs. self-relevance).  In Study 2, 
a significant main effect was found for person but not strategy.  Across both studies, the self-
other memory distinction was abolished in the survival condition.  These results provide 
evidence that “adaptive memory” provides a unique and stimuli-specific memory advantage and 
cannot be understood as an enhanced self-reference effect.  Implications for the role of each 
encoding condition in maladaptive memory are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Human memory is one of the most compelling areas of research in the fields of 
psychology and neuroscience.  Our memories serve to create identities for ourselves and to help 
us navigate the broader world.  They are what we use to differentiate ourselves as human, rather 
than organic machines which simply react to proximal stimuli in our environment – but memory 
itself is a product of both our internal and external environments.   
The context of and method by which an event is processed influences the nature of both 
the memory itself and our ability to recall that memory.  Our limited attentional resources, for 
example, result in the memory formation only for the information to which we choose to direct 
our attention (Shapiro, et al, 1997).  Our emotional state is also known to have a significant 
impact on memory. Emotionally-arousing events are often remembered to a greater degree than 
neutral events (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003; Sharot, Martorella, Delgado, & Phelps, 2007) and 
come with an altered subjective quality, such as enhanced perceived vividness (Todd, et al., 
2013).  This is an adaptive memory process – if an event is significant enough to trigger 
emotional arousal, it is worth encoding, consolidating and remembering, as your life may depend 
on it (Eaton & Anderson, 2018); arousal, however, can also render memory maladaptive 
following trauma, resulting in intrusive recall (Bryant, et al., 2013; Todd, et al., 2014; Fridman, 
et al., 2012).   In addition to arousal – which has a pronounced effect on post-encoding processes 
(Anderson, et al., 2006; Cahill & Alkire, 2003) – are the appraisals during encoding that 
influence later memory, which are often less appreciated in emotional memory.  One way of 
processing an event in the context of one’s own life is the survival encoding effect, also known 
as “adaptive memory” (Nairne, Thompson & Pandeirada, 2007), which posits that fitness-related 
stimuli are preferentially encoded and remembered.  Such survival encoding has been 
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consistently replicated (see Nairne, 2014 for a review) across different stimuli.  Thus, even under 
low emotional salience and arousal, the appraisal of an object with regard to survival has 
substantial memory enhancing benefits.   Here we examined how different emotionally-relevant 
appraisals at encoding influence memory for low emotional salience materials, including neutral 
concrete nouns in Study 1 and abstract personal traits in Study 2.   Examining survival (i.e., 
survival-relevant or not), self-relevance (me or not), and valence (pleasant or not) encoding in 
conjunction can reveal whether such appraisals represent common or distinct contributions to 
adaptive memory, independently of intrinsic emotional significance.  Determining the influence 
of emotion-independent encoding strategies on memory can provide necessary insight into the 
individual differences involved in the development of maladaptive memory.  
Adaptive memory examinations typically involve asking participants to rate common 
nouns based on their relevance to the participant’s survival in an evolutionary hunter-gatherer 
environment, later testing for free recall.  Survival memory shows greater recall for common 
nouns processed in relation to a survival context than to other schema-evoking contexts (e.g., 
moving to a new residence), as well as other deep encoding strategies – that is, strategies which 
use abstract, semantic, or associative processing for greater recall (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
Craik & Tulving, 1975).   However, inherent in the processing of one’s own survival is self-
reference.   The self-reference effect demonstrates that information processed in relation to the 
self is associated with greater recall and recognition memory (Rogers, et al, 1977; see 
Cunningham & Turk, 2017 for a review).  Given the importance of the role of altered sense-of-
self and perceived threat to survival in extreme emotional reactions in peritraumatic processing 
(Ehlers & Clark, 2000), it is important to determining the specific role self-referential processing 
has in the survival encoding effect.   This will allow for a deeper understanding of the effect of 
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specific cognitive appraisals on emotional and trauma-related memory.  The purpose of the 
current study is to determine whether survival encoding and self-reference are distinct or 
common influences on memory recall and how they compare to basic judgements of valence. 
Survival encoding results in greater recall than judgments of how easily a word brings to 
mind an important personal experience (Nairne et al 2007).  Other efforts have been made to 
address the role of self-reference in survival encoding with mixed results, manipulating self-
reference by orienting participants toward the survival value of objects for themselves or others 
(Weinstein, et al. 2008; Kang, et al., 2008; Klein, 2012; Cunningham et al. 2013; Dewhurst et al, 
2017).  Cunningham, et al. (2013) suggested that between-subjects designs allow for the 
participant to project the self onto the ‘other’ persona in the paradigm and are therefore 
insufficient in separating self and other in examining survival encoding.  In a repeated measures 
self/other comparison the self-survival condition had a recall boost over the other survival 
condition.  However, while survival encoding is more powerful than self-reference, and survival 
processing of the self is more powerful than survival processing of non-self entities, the precise 
role of self-reference in survival encoding is unknown (Klein, 2012).  Specifically, does survival 
encoding function as an augmented version of self-reference, or is it a unique and distinct 
encoding process?  
Dewhurst and colleagues (2017) questioned the style of self-reference paradigms used in 
extant survival encoding literature – in particular, the use of episodic self-relevant vignettes.  The 
most robust self-reference effect emerges when one rates the relevance of trait words to oneself 
(e.g. Maki & McCaul, 1985).  When examining both self-reference and survival encoding 
processes using traits, (e.g., are you honest, is honesty needed for survival) self-referential 
processing outperforms survival encoding – a result opposite to the typical survival encoding 
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recall advantage.  They also did not find an advantage for survival encoding relative to valence 
encoding.  These findings question the specific nature of survival encoding processing, its 
relation to self-reference and valence encoding, as well as their specific role in enhancing 
memory for specific stimuli. 
Establishing the survival encoding effect as distinct from self-referential encoding would 
suggest that the processing of information in the context of life-or-death, irrespective of 
emotional arousal and of self-relevance, is an appraisal that lends a unique advantage to 
emotional memories.  The current paper aims to further clarify the nature of survival encoding 
and the role of self-reference in survival encoding across paradigms.  We utilise a within-
subjects design using a self-other distinction across two studies.  In Study 1 we examine the 
processing effects using concrete nouns; in Study 2 we apply the same paradigm using abstract 
traits.  In Study 1, we hypothesize there will be a recall advantage for survival conditions over 
reference conditions, and for self-referent conditions over other-referent conditions.  If they 
originate from independent appraisals, then we expect survival and reference encoding effects to 
be additive.  Survival encoding is thought to display adaptive memory as it reflects some 
evolutionary orientation of assessing survival needs, which concerns the utility of objects in the 
environment and not personal characteristics needed for survival.  As such, we expect material 
specificity for survival encoding, and thus, in Study 2, memory for personal traits will not be 
subject to a survival encoding advantage. 
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Study 1 
Rationale 
The current study sets out to extend the basic survival encoding findings for use with a 
within-subjects design and to parse out the roles of self and other appraisals within each of the 
Survival Encoding and Self-Reference effects.  When the Survival Encoding paradigm has been 
adapted to examine self-other differences previously (Weinstein, et al., 2008; Cunningham, et al., 
2013), the stimuli used were the concrete nouns typical of survival encoding literature.  When 
directly comparing the two separate encoding effects, each condition used a separate set of 
stimuli.  The current design therefore attempts to effectively clarify the role of self-reference by 
controlling for differences in presented stimuli. 
Methods 
Participants.  Sixty (60) undergraduate Cornell students participated in exchange for course 
extra credit.  Running a power analysis in G*Power on a repeated measures ANOVA with two 
measurements with an alpha level of 0.05 and a medium effect size (f= .25) (Faul et al., 2013), 
the required sample size is 54.  All procedures were approved by the Cornell University 
Institutional Review Board and all participants provided their informed consent.   
Materials and design.  Five word lists of 32 words (160 words total) were developed from the 
updated Battig and Montigue norms (Van Overschelde, Rawson, & Dunlosky, 2004) and the 
updated Clark and Paivio norms (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968), which were balanced on 
valence, word frequency, semantic category, and word length. Meryl Streep was selected as the 
‘Other’ figure as 96% of 303 sampled undergraduate Cornell students could identify her and she 
had the highest pleasantness rating of all sampled celebrities (84%). 
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Procedure.  Upon arrival, participants were brought through the informed consent process and 
asked to complete the three individual differences questionnaires.  Participants were given 
instructions and taken through a practice rating task.  For each condition, the following 
instructions were presented and each word was rated on a 5 point Likert scale which ranged from 
“Not relevant at all” to “Extremely relevant” for the survival encoding conditions, “Not well at 
all” to “Extremely well” for the self-reference conditions, and “Not pleasant at all” to 
“Extremely pleasant” for the pleasantness condition.  Each participant rated words in all five 
conditions.   
Self-Survival.      In this task we would like you to imagine that you are stranded in the 
grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials.  Over the next few 
months, you will need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect yourself from 
predators.  You will be presented with a list of words, and we would like you to rate how 
relevant each word would be for you to have in this survival situation.  Some of the words 
may be relevant and others may not—it is up to you to decide. 
Other-Survival.      In this task we would like you to imagine that Meryl Streep is stranded 
in the grasslands of a foreign land, without any basic survival materials.  Over the next few 
months, she will need to find steady supplies of food and water and protect herself from 
predators.  You will be presented with a list of words, and we would like you to rate how 
relevant each word would be for Meryl Streep to have in this survival situation.  Some of 
the words may be relevant and others may not—it is up to you to decide. 
SURVIVAL OF THE SELF   7 
 
 
 
 
Self-Referential.      In the following set of trials, you will be presented with a list of words 
and be asked to judge how well each word relates to you.  Some will relate to you and 
others will not – it is up to you to decide. 
Other-Referential.      In the following set of trials, you will be presented with a list of 
words and be asked to judge how well each word relates to Meryl Streep.  Some will relate 
to her and others will not – it is up to you to decide. 
Pleasantness.      In the following set of trials, you will be presented with a list of words 
and be asked to judge how pleasant or unpleasant you find the word.  Some will be 
pleasant and others will not – it is up to you to decide. 
The study controlled and randomized the order of the words presented, as well as 
counterbalanced the use of each word list across the five conditions using Latin Squares.  In 
addition, each condition was split into word lists of five to six words, and the presentation of 
each condition in the experiment was counterbalanced using Latin Squares. 
Following the word rating paradigm, participants completed a short distractor task 
involving remembering and recalling a series of digits (as described in Nairne, Thompson & 
Pandeirada, 2007).  They next completed a surprise free recall task which was timed for 10 
minutes.  Proportion of words recalled was calculated for each condition (the number of words 
correctly recalled over the number of words presented for each condition).  
Results 
A two-by-two repeated measures ANOVA was run comparing person (self vs. other) to 
encoding strategy (survival vs. reference).  Self conditions were found to have an advantage over 
other conditions, with a significant main effect found for person (F(1,59) = 21.77, p < . 001). 
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Survival conditions were found to have an advantage over reference conditions, with a 
significant main effect for strategy (F(1,59) = 60.41, p < .001). A significant interaction effect 
between person and strategy was also found (F(1,59) = 10.31, p < .01; see Figure 1).  Pairwise 
comparisons of the interaction revealed that recall for survival self and survival other were both 
significantly higher than for self-reference (p < .01; p < .05) but survival self was not 
significantly different from survival other (p = 0.29).  Difference in reaction time and subjective 
word ratings were found to be nonsignificant across conditions.  Order of word presentation did 
not affect recall (p = 0.51).  Cohen’s d was 0.39. 
To assess the above effects relative to valence encoding, we conducted an additional one-
way repeated ANOVA with 5-levels representing the distinct encoding strategy conditions.  
Follow up contrasts on the significant effect of strategy (F(1,59) = 13.70, p < .001) revealed that 
valence encoding had a robust effect on recall, with even self-survival not significantly differing 
than valence encoding (p = 0.11). 
Study 1 Discussion 
Both survival and self-reference encoding gave a clear recall advantage, with self-
survival resulting in numerically the greatest recall.  Survival other was more accurate than both 
the self-reference and other-reference conditions, suggesting an additional boost for survival 
encoding over self-reference.  However, the interaction between encoding conditions, revealed a 
partial lack of independence of these encoding strategies, with a subadditive effect of survival 
self-encoding.  The self-reference effect (self greater than other) was largely abolished within the 
survival strategy condition.  That there was no significant difference in recall between the 
survival self and survival other conditions may indicate a suppression of the self-reference effect 
by the survival encoding effect.  We can conclude that survival encoding provides a memory 
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advantage greater than that of self-reference, and due to its effect on other-focused processing, 
operates differently than would be expected of an augmented self-reference effect.   
Study 2 
Rationale 
Although survival encoding was shown to be more robust than self-reference, in Study 1 
the stimuli were drawn from databases used throughout the survival encoding literature, 
consisting of concrete nouns.  Self-reference is classically demonstrated using trait words – 
adjectives which may or may not describe a trait one sees in oneself.   Study 1 demonstrated that 
self-reference did extend to enhanced memory for concrete nouns but this may underestimate the 
robustness of the self-reference effect from semantically distinct trait categories typical of 
survival encoding studies.  That self-reference did not significantly augment the recall advantage 
of survival encoding may also be material specific.  Thinking about the personality traits one 
may need for survival may reveal an additive effect of these two appraisal strategies, counter to 
the self-survival suppression effect we found in Study 1.   By contrast, survival encoding may 
represent a specific adaptation for the utility of objects in the environment for our survival needs 
and thus would be unrelated to reflection upon our internal virtues and failings.    
In Study 2, we set out to determine whether (a) the survival encoding effect generalises to 
other types of stimuli, (b) we see a stronger self-other difference within each of our strategy 
conditions using stimuli that are known to show a robust self-reference effect, and (c) we still see 
a difference between the survival encoding and self-reference effects given different stimuli. 
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Methods 
Participants.  Sixty-one (61) undergraduate Cornell students participated in exchange for course 
extra credit.  Running a power analysis in G*Power on a repeated measures ANOVA with two 
measurements with an alpha level of 0.05 and a medium effect size (f = .25) (Faul et al., 2013), 
the required sample size is 54.  All procedures were approved by the Cornell University 
Institutional Review Board and all participants provided their informed consent. 
Materials and design.  Five word lists of 32 words (a total of 160 words) were developed from 
Anderson’s (1968) personality trait words, which were balanced on valence, word frequency, 
semantic category and word length.  The procedure was as described for Study 1. 
Results 
A two-by-two repeated measures ANOVA was run comparing person (self vs. other) to 
encoding strategy (survival vs. reference).  Self conditions were found to have an advantage over 
other conditions, with a significant main effect found for person (F(1,60) = 17.29, p < . 001); a 
significant interaction effect between person and strategy was also found (F(1,60) = 29.63, p < 
.001; see Figure 2).  By contrast with self-reference encoding, there was little evidence for a 
survival encoding effect on traits.  The interaction revealed that survival encoding appears to 
again largely diminish the self-reference effect.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that recall for 
self-reference was higher than other-reference (p < .001) as well as higher than survival self (p < 
.001).  Survival self again did not differ from survival other (p = 0.32).  However, survival other 
was higher than other-reference (p = .07), indicating a small effect of survival encoding on traits.  
Difference in reaction time and subjective word ratings were found to be nonsignificant across 
conditions.  Order of word presentation did not affect recall (p = 0.24).  Cohen’s d was 0.36. 
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To assess the above effects relative to the valence encoding, we conducted an additional 
one-way repeated ANOVA with 5-levels representing the distinct encoding strategy conditions.  
Follow up contrasts on the significant effect of strategy (F(1,60) = 7.52, p < .001), revealed that 
valence encoding had a robust effect on recall, with even self-survival not significantly differing 
than valence encoding (p = 0.3). 
Study 2 Discussion 
The survival encoding effect did not generalise to trait stimuli.  A greater self-other 
difference was seen within the reference condition compared to Study 1.  This was expected 
given that the stimuli in this paradigm were selected to demonstrate a self-reference effect.  Both 
the self-other difference within the survival encoding effect and the difference between survival 
other and reference other were abolished.  As in Study 1, the self-reference effect appeared to 
operate differently from the survival encoding effect consistent with its expression being highly 
material specific. 
Discussion  
When examining concrete words, the survival encoding effect shows a clear recall 
advantage over self-reference.  This is evident both from the recall advantage itself and from the 
fact that the survival other condition maintains a recall advantage over self-reference, and 
survival processing provides a recall advantage to other-oriented processing which is otherwise 
associated with low recall.  
Additionally, the examination of both the self-reference and survival encoding effects 
using trait words, although failing to show a recall advantage for survival encoding, 
demonstrates that self-reference and survival encoding operate differently, and, regardless of 
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presented stimuli, the survival encoding effect overpowers the self-other distinction in memory 
processing.  Across both studies, no significant differences were found between survival self and 
survival other conditions.  Survival-related processing thus abolishes the self-other differences 
consistently observed in self-referential processing.  The self-reference aspect of the survival 
encoding effect is overridden by the survival processing effect. 
Much like Dewhurst et al (2017), the self-reference condition in Study 2 gives a recall 
advantage over self-survival – but, as with Study 1, the self-other distinction expected within the 
survival condition is absent.  Any self-referential processing that may be inherent in survival 
encoding either does not differentiate between self and other or provides a memory advantage to 
other-focused processing that is not present in purely self-referential processing. 
If the mere processing of information with reference to the self were driving the survival 
encoding effect, the type of presented stimuli would have comparable effects on both types of 
conditions.  However, the self-survival and self-reference conditions operate in distinct and 
different ways when trait words are used as stimuli.  Survival encoding is strongest when 
processing concrete nouns – physical objects which have an immediate impact on present 
survival – and abstract concepts such as traits are less accessible in survival-relevant scenarios.  
These data demonstrate that a type of appraisal at work during self-reference is largely distinct 
from survival encoding. 
Our sense of self is essential to our survival; our ability to successfully interact with the 
world is dependent on not only identifying threats in the environment.  An awareness of our own 
personal abilities and weaknesses is necessary to effectively navigate our environment and stay 
alive, and our ability to accurately engage self-referential encoding underlies this.   However, 
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determining a threat in the environment and how to engage with that threat is more immediate 
and important than determining whether the threat is to you or to someone else, and thus the 
power of self-referential processing in a survival scenario is diminished. 
Processing information as survival-relevant even when it is neutral provides a unique 
memory advantage and cannot be characterized as a greater self-reference effect.  The interaction 
between survival and reference conditions suggests an interdependency despite acting as distinct 
encoding processes.  Strategies that people utilise at encoding can affect later retrieval (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972); of note is the fact that these encoding strategies do not always provide an 
adaptive advantage (Dunmore, et al, 1999).  Rather, we see in trauma literature that particular 
encoding strategies – or cognitive appraisals of the event – can make individuals vulnerable to 
psychopathology (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  Two individuals can experience the same objective 
trauma, but the encoding strategy utilised can determine whether one recovers from the trauma 
or suffers a chronic, maladaptive reaction.  Specifically, if one interprets a traumatic event as 
catastrophic or threatening to their life or self (see Elwood, et al, 2009 for a review), that 
individual is at risk for developing a maladaptive trauma response such as posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), a disorder particularly characterized by intrusive memory recall.  PTSD in turn 
alters the brain structurally and functionally (see Nutt & Malizia, 2004 for a review).  This 
overlap between the lasting physiological effects of self-processing and survival-processing 
during traumatic experiences supports the present results. 
In order to meet diagnostic criteria for PTSD, an individual must experience an event 
perceived to be either a severe threat to their own life or safety, or to the life or safety of another 
(DSM-5, 2013).  Only 17.7% of trauma-exposed individuals develop chronic PTSD (Santiago, et 
al., 2013); high emotional arousal at the time of encoding is inherent to that event being 
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classified as a trauma, and thus emotional arousal is insufficient in explaining the development 
of PTSD.  Rather, the cognitive appraisals engaged at encoding of the trauma determine the 
trajectory of the disease (Ehlers & Clark, 2000).  A single encoding event of peritraumatic self-
referential catastrophizing can lead to PTSD; similarly, encoding an event as being threatening to 
one’s survival can have the same effect.  Self-referential processing alone is insufficient in 
triggering maladaptive memory, but its conjunction with life-or-death processing may contribute. 
Processing an event as threating to the survival of oneself is only one mechanism for the 
development of PTSD; witnessing a separate individual experience a trauma can have the same 
result (Patki, et al, 2015). Additionally, the long-term cognitive and physiological outcomes of 
engaging in life-or-death processing of a traumatic event are the same whether you are 
processing information related to your own survival or someone else’s survival.  The present 
results demonstrate on a behavioural level that self-other processing distinctions are 
overpowered by the impact of survival processing. 
The way in which someone interprets and processes an event on a cognitive level, 
irrespective of level of emotional arousal, can affect their memory recall and have significant, 
lasting changes to their brain and body.  The concept of “adaptive memory” may be used to 
elucidate the role of threat-to-life processing in later memory outside the context of emotional or 
physiological arousal.  Interestingly, the survival encoding effect is strongest when participants 
are primed with an evolutionary hunter-gatherer survival scenario, even when compared to other 
self-survival conditions (Wilson, 2016); consequently, this memory effect is believed to reflect 
an evolutionary adaptation which aids in seeking physical objects for our survival.   
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Further directions include a deeper exploration of this cognitive strategy and its 
interaction with self-reference; in particular, determining whether the abolishing of the self-other 
distinction in survival encoding is universal or situational.  Survival encoding is most robust 
when processing concrete objects, but it is unknown whether threats specific to oneself compared 
to threats specific to another, such as idiosyncratic life-threatening allergies, alter the encoding 
strategies utilised.  Additionally, a topic of exploration is the power of survival encoding versus 
self-reference in social ostracization versus concrete fear-inducing threats, given that social 
ostracization triggers survival-related fear (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004). 
Deeper examinations of survival encoding and its neural correlates could contribute to a 
new understanding of the nature of life-or-death processing and of traumatic memory and its 
variance among individuals.  Determining the neural correlates of the unique survival encoding 
strategy and its relation to event processing in traumatic memory could have important 
implications for the interactive nature of emotion, memory, trauma, and arousal.  The present 
study has contributed to steps taken in understanding this strategy, but further examinations can 
solidify the specific underlying mechanisms and thereby identify an intervention target for 
people who utilise maladaptive encoding processes. 
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Figure 1.  Recall Memory by Encoding Strategy in Study 1 Utilising Concrete Nouns.  Survival and 
self-reference both give a recall advantage.  Survival encoding results in the greatest recall 
advantage and abolishes self-other memory distinctions. 
  
 
Figure 2.  Recall Memory by Encoding Strategy in Study 2 Utilising Abstract Traits. Self-reference 
gives a recall advantage over survival encoding. Survival encoding abolishes self-other memory 
distinctions. 
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